DERIVED PRIVACY PROJECTION — NOT BYTE-IDENTICAL TO HISTORICAL SOURCE
Source public.1 SHA256: d326a9a9a35c857c4121bc12567c8e28a32ea81a0d9ce245a110ec65e027c820
PUBLIC2-OPAQUE labels are synthetic; original signature does not cover these bytes.
Historical assessments below retain their historical scope, subject to public.2 limitations.

SUPPORTED EXPERIMENTAL CLAIM
The preserved genuine Linux run on PUBLIC2-OPAQUE-GUEST-01 shows custodian UID/GID 5200 and executor UID/GID 5206. It issued one grant, prepared one handle, then committed exactly one protected write: object:X = linux-isolation-207-authorized. The grant and handle were consumed. The four later native negative cases added no protected object effects and no renewed authority.

The no-authority case returned FAIL_SAFELY with reason EZA-OBJECTIVE-UNFULFILLABLE-WITHIN-AUTHORITY and blocking reason EZA-AUTHORITY-ABSENT. Consumed-grant replay and the out-of-scope request returned EZA-REPLAY-DETECTED. The spent-handle attempt returned EZA-REQUEST-BINDING-MISMATCH; this proves that exact attempt was refused, not that every possible spent-handle attack was isolated.

The out-of-scope case does not independently establish scope enforcement because replay detection refused first. Manual UID 5206 protected-file write-open denial is user-reported and INCONCLUSIVE: two sudo sessions corroborate UID 5206 execution, but their stdin code, four exact target paths, errno values, exit status and Terminal results are unavailable in the located records. They cannot be conclusively tied to the reported test. No historical same-tick mutation experiment against the live installation is established; NOT EXECUTED.

CURRENT OBSERVATIONS, NOT RETROACTIVE ATTACK PROOF
The unchanged security.verify_install() passes under the private Linux runtime and includes verify_runtime(). All 170 non-runtime source/preparation files match preserved Candidate 152. Current custodian PID 27309, invocation 6c869f2e56c2482fb08786981afc7940, UID/GID 5200, match historical observations. The current authority payload, proof, ledger, tickets and issuer binding equal attempt 219. The 22 ledger files and checkpoint match the earlier physical hashes, device/inodes, owners, modes and ACLs. Current state.sqlite, witness and recovery file hashes are recorded; matching historical physical hashes for these three were not established. Logical consistency is not proof that no transient or restored modification occurred.

Historical and current maintenance evidence pass the unchanged verifier and an independent host replay. Native result-contract checks pass for five saved action results. These observations do not rerun experiments. Seven protocol transactions include issuance, preparation, the authorized commit and four refusals. A COMMITTED refusal receipt means durable denial bookkeeping, not a protected write. Four auxiliary-budget increments, clock, revision and history changes are expected bookkeeping.

LIMITS
Root, Linux kernel, systemd/journald, installer trust anchor and observation transport are trusted. Hashes establish byte identity and internal consistency, not independent historical provenance beyond the retained records. Independent review here is a new read-only examination by this reviewing agent, not an unnamed outside reviewer or laboratory certification. No universal security, production-readiness, arbitrary filesystem isolation, kernel/root compromise, isolated scope-check, or unexecuted same-tick-resistance claim. No signing or publication has occurred.
